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Doing things and how to do it 
This was prepared after attending a day at a conference, “Doing things with things,” which was held 
as part of the preparation for an edited book with papers from the various speakers… 
Attending only one day makes it difficult to say whether or not some themes have been attended to 
at the conference or not. It seemed to me, however, that what lacked was an understanding of the 
very activity of actually doing something with something. One discussion revolved around the 
intended use and the non-intended use, and I will try to look into this issue later in these notes. 
Vermaas and Houkes who tried to revive the concept of plans in use raised another discussion. As I 
remember it, they focused on plans as deliberations on how artefacts can be used to achieve 
something. And they claimed that “use” is ambiguously accounted for in Gibson. What they wanted 
was a shift in focus from function to plans. This spurred my thoughts on what artefacts are and how 
they become a part of our activity and this first part of the notes is a search for an answer to the 
second part, whereas the second part of the notes is a search for the first as this is connected with 
intended and non-intended use.  
 
So first I try to see what kind of activities is available to the human agent, and through example, 
drawings and discussion to connect it with the distinction between operation, action and agency. 
 
This paper is dedicated mainly to the analysis of different levels of tool use. There is a tentative 
search for the different levels of affordances as activity, but I am not sure this is fully developed. In 
an article by Leeuwen, Smitsman & Leeuween (1994) the development of tool use in early 
childhood from an affordance perspective is more fully examined: 
“The study of tool use focuses attention on situations in which the organism realizes its needs not 
immediately but by using environmental resources as means to an end. In this sense, tool use 
represents mediated action.” (op.cit., p.174) 
I will later argue that we should be wary about the term “mediate” as its connotation is closely 
connected with that of “indirect,” and that we easily slip into the trap of classical representational 
thinking. Michotte (1951/1991) asked himself this question: “Is the perception of the tool function 
direct?” (p.88) From trying to answer this through experiments he made a concept of “tool effect”: 
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“the intervention of the intermediary appears to be purely passive and dependent on the action of 
the motor object with which it is integrated as a constituent part; it is this which gives it a 
characteristic phenomenal aspect.” (op.cit. p.97-98). By varying the speed of the objects Michotte 
found that the objects were no longer perceived as passive but as self-acting. It should be noted that 
what interested Michotte was the perceiving of two objects independent of the perceiver’s own 
activity. That is, in the different motions of two objects meeting each other there is information 
about whether it is a tool affecting something or another kind of causal impression. What is 
important here is that there is information in the motion of a tool that makes it possible for us to 
distinguish it as a specific tool. Furthermore, Michotte suggested that this information is actually 
the primary source of the concept of tools.  
“It seems logical to suppose that the primary source of this concept [tool or instrument] ought to be 
found in the tool effect in its strict sense, rather than in those complex cases where the instrumental 
function is attributed to an object on the basis of simple temporal relations despite the existence of a 
kinematic discontinuity.” (op.cit., p.102).  
“Finally, would it be too outrageous to suppose that the tool effect also marks the starting point for 
the intentional use of tools at the very dawn of humanity?” (ibid.) 
So Michotte thinks that the fact that there is a directly perceivable relation between two objects 
specifiable as a tool relation (the tool effect) leads to the concept of tools and intentional use of 
tools. It is not just or primarily the functional development of the tool as an extension of bodily 
skills, but this causal relation between things. 
For Leeuwen et al (1994) this and the concept of affordance lead to the below figure: 
 
 
Figure from Leeuween et al (1994): the text is: “Relationships among actor, tool, and target as mutually 
constraining complementarities in a second-order affordance structure” (p.176) 
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Leeuwen et al (1994) concludes that: “In becoming a tool, an object must be handled by an actor in 
relation to other objects or substances. Therefore, tool use was defined as performing an action on a 
target by performing an action on a tool. The action on the tool is embedded in the action on the 
target.” (p.188-189). 
This is implicitly the same definition that I have come to use in the below analysis. For academic 
reasons it should be noted, however, that this might be too loose a use of this concept, as it is not 
just the immediate use that constitute a tool but also the production history, the social linguistic 
embeddedness and the common praxis (or canonical use) that the tool rests in, which is of 
importance. Tool use, defined only as use, will make difficult the differences between the tool use 
of certain animal species and human beings. I am not saying that other animals do not use objects as 
tools, but rather that these objects are not tools in the sense that they have been produced for a 
purpose, are conceptualised as specific kinds of tools, and have canonical uses in a social praxis. 
For now, however, this needs not concern us. 
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A) Doing things 
 
 
Figure 1: A) Doing things. 
 
This first figure illustrates the operation where the tool, in this case, a screwdriver, is picked up by 
finding it in the room, walking towards it, picking it up, and holding it. As such, the tool is not used 
but only found, and therefore it is only ‘doing things’ in the sense of ‘doing something’. There is no 
distinct difference between this kind of activity and other kind of activity directed towards non-
artefacts, like finding an apple and picking it up, or finding a stick.  
The no. 1) in the figure is signifying the activity that the agent does, what the object affords. In this 
example it could be “reachable”, “pick-up-able”, and “wield-able”, all three being relational 
concepts as it implies an object that can be reached by an agent with the ability to walk towards and 
reach out for the object, and an object, of a certain size fitting the agent’s hand(-s) and within a lift-
able weight range depending on the strength of the agent. The object is affording these kinds of 
activity only when the object and the agent have a certain ‘fit’. The object and the agent are also 
constraining the possible affordances, as there are things the agent cannot do with the object, both 
qua the physical properties of the object, and qua the physical properties of the agent (and, we 
might add, because of the social constraints in which the agent is embedded).  
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If this is the only thing the agent wants, finding and picking up the screwdriver, then there is an 
almost complete overlap with what the object affords and the intention of the agent, the goal-
directed activity. The goal of picking up the screwdriver consists of the operation of reaching it and 
picking it up. For the design of the artefact, i.e. the screwdriver, to fulfil the intension of the user it 
needs to be designed with respect to these operations. The research by Whyte et al. (1994) on 
infants has shown, however, that the intention of reaching for something not only depends on the 
object but also depends on the nature of the task. They found: 
"…a clear trend for grip configuration to vary as a function of action within the same 
object geometry. Thus, the influence of object size on the affordance of differential 
actions was consistent across the two experiments...These findings are consistent with 
the notion that action is an emergent property of the interaction of three sources of 
constraint - namely, the environment, the organism, and the task.." (p.217, italics 
added) 
 
That is, how the operation is nested in an overall task of doing something determines how we 
actually perform the specific operation. So the first figure is way to simple to be of any use in the 
every day world. 
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B) Doing something with a thing 
 
 
Figure 2: B) Doing things with things. 
 
The second figure advances the first figure a bit. Here we have 1) where the agent has found and 
picked up the screwdriver and is now holding it, and 2) the agent starts doing something with it on 
the table. The agent is actually ‘doing something with the thing’. Lets say he is scratching on the 
surface of the table with the screwdriver, then the activity the agent is performing consists of two 
different activities, first, holding the screwdriver by its handle in his hands, and second, scratching 
the surface with the tip of the screwdriver. What Gibson (e.g. 1979, p.40-41) and Activity Theory 
have noticed is that, in doing this kind of activity, the first kind of activity seemed to disappear from 
the attentional awareness. If something is wrong with the handle, the attention immediately shifts 
from the tip to the handle. But given that the handle stays where it is supposed to be, we just 
happily scratch the surface on the table. Gestalt psychology would say that there is an attentional 
‘figure-ground’ relation here, the tip is the ‘figure’, and the rest, including the handle, is the 
‘ground’ or in the background.  
Steenbergen et al, 1997, Eco. Psych. 9(2): tool use as attached to the body to extend the capacity for 
action. See p.115, it is not enough to focus on the implementation of an object for it to become a 
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tool, it is also necessary to focus on the “activity of tool use itself rather than internal cognitive 
mechanisms” 
The no. 3) signifies this attentional awareness and is the direction of the agent’s attention as well as 
his intention. He intends to scratch the surface with the screwdriver in his hands, and so his goal 
directed activity is towards the surface of the table and its “scratch-ability”. So we now have two 
levels of affordances that are purely relational, and cannot be understood without understanding the 
agent, the table, and the tool. The tool is “hold-able” or “wield-able” at the handle, and the table is 
“scratch-able” only with the tip of the screwdriver (we might try scratching with our nails but not to 
much avail). So the affordance “scratch-able” implies the hardened metal tip on a tool like the 
screwdriver, and the affordance “hold-able” implies the above-specified relation between hands and 
tool. But given that the agent holds the screwdriver in his hands, he picks up the information about 
the table as affording “scratch-able” if he is inclined to do some scratching, depending, obviously, 
on the surface material of the table and the tool in hand.  
The agent intends to scratch the surface of the table and so this is what he has planned for. He might 
know what the table is made of; he might know which tool is best for the job; and he might know the 
best way of doing some serious scratching. All this knowledge might not be explicit knowledge but 
could just as well be implicit, or tacit, knowledge (e.g. Polanyi, 1962). What is important is that the 
agent wants to scratch the table, so he picks up the appropriate (!) tool and goes to work. All this 
does not have to be in close vicinity, temporal nor spatial, as there in the task is the necessary 
information for the experienced “scratcher” to do a decent job. The inexperienced “scratcher” will, 
however, need to have the things somewhat closer at hand, for example, a variety of tools used on 
various tables. Mammen (199X?) showed how we can disregard the tool when we have used it to 
examine the invariant relation between two objects. That is, the tool does not affect the substance-
relation, but are used to discover the relation between objects. A diamond does not become harder 
than a stone just because we scratch it with a screwdriver. If we use a screwdriver to explore both 
the stone and the diamond we will be able to discover a relation (diamond harder than stone) that is 
independent of the tool that we uses (screwdriver, pen or sword it makes no difference). An 
experienced “scratcher” has made a lot of these explorations and will know that oak is harder than 
pine and therefore needs either more force applied or another, sharper tool to scratch it. It seems 
that this was the relation that Michotte found was directly perceivable. 
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C) Doing something with things with things 
 
 
Figure 3: C) Doing things with things with things. 
 
The third figure is an even further complication of the activity. The no. 1) is still the screwdriver 
being held in the hand of the agent but now no. 2) is the tip of the screwdriver resting on the head of 
a screw. No. 3), then, is the screw being screwed into the table through a piece of wood. For the 
agent skilled in the art of using a screwdriver the attention is on the unseen, but felt, presence of the 
tip of the screw being driven into the table and neither on the grip of the screwdriver nor on the tip 
of the screwdriver resting on the head of the screw. What is of interest for the agent is whether the 
table is of a substance that is “screw-into-able” and how much force should be applied to do so. So 
no. 4) is the direction of the goal, in as much as the agent wants to screw a screw into the table 
through a piece of wood. The fulfilling of this goal now consists of finding and holding the 
screwdriver and the screw, positioning the screwdriver on the head of the screw, and screwing the 
screw into the table.  
 
This example is, of course, a simplified version of the complexity of our daily activity. I think that 
at least a fourth type of doing things within this illustration can be identified but this is not relevant 
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right now. These three types seem, however, to be the most common in our daily messing around 
with the things in our surroundings so let me summarize these: 
Doing things: A is where the goal and the main operation coincide. We pick something up just to 
hold it, lift it, or carry it. 
Doing things with things: B is where the goal is something that the thing can do for us (the thing as 
an actor? The relation between the agent and the thing as an actant (a la Latour)?). We lift the cup 
and drink the liquid contained by it; we write with the pen; and we switch the light on or off. 
Doing things with things with things: C is where the goal is not the thing we hold in our hand but 
something we use the thing we hold in our hands (for example) for to do something to another thing 
which might affect yet another thing. These three types are the most abstracted unit of analysis for 
something to remain meaningful. 
 
Let us consider the process of making coffee (in some elaborate detail, I am sorry to say): There are 
a couple of things that need to be in order before I can brew my coffee. I need to get water and cook 
it, as I make filter coffee, and I need to prepare my filter and coffee can, so I can pour the hot water 
over the beans and into the can. I might also need to crush the coffee beans first if the coffee 
company have not done this. This very abbreviated process typically takes about 5-10 minutes all in 
all, though the agent (i.e., me) does not have to be solely occupied by making coffee in this span of 
time. I have tried to illustrate this in the below figure: 
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Figure 4: the coffee making process 
 
Please note that the agent is not illustrated before the actual drinking of the coffee, which signifies 
the end of this overall event. This is not because the agent is not present during the coffee-making 
but because the intention with the activity is to make drink-able coffee and drink it. There is a kind 
of hierarchy in the order of making coffee even though some of the things are interchangeable. I 
have to cook the water before pouring it over the beans, but I need to get water first, and I also have 
to get a boiler before getting the water. Before I pour the cooked water I need to prepare the coffee 
can and the filter, and after making the coffee I might want to put all the things back to their 
appropriate place, so as not to make too much of a mess.  
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All the elements of this kind of coffee making requires an agent who can lift, hold, wield, place, put 
and so on, in short, do something. But the interesting thing is not just on this level but also the way 
the agent does something with various particular things. Or in other words, it would be impossible 
to decompose the coffee making into the “direct” (? [direct meaning what I bodily “relates” to, A]) 
operational aspect of the process.  
The next level is what the agent does with the things. Here, I cook water; place filter and holder 
together and pour beans into the filter; pour water over the beans; remove the holder and dispose of 
the filter; put the things back; screw the lid back on the can; and pour the fresh coffee into the cup, 
which I have previously taken out of the cabinet. These things also have a “direct” operational 
aspect, but the interesting thing is not me holding them, but what the things do when I do something 
with them, like holding the boiler and inclining it into a certain degree of inclination while 
positioning it over the coffee can and its filter holder containing coffee beans resulting in the water 
pouring over the beans. In the theory of Vygotsky the tools mediate certain human activities, but 
this does not mean that activity are in-direct in the sense that it is less immediately perceivable as an 
activity than non-tool activity. Rather, it is another kind of “directness,” not as indirect but rather as 
inter-direct. By inter-direct I mean that it signifies the relational aspect between two objects and the 
agent; there is a “direct,” or lawful, relation between the agent and the object in hand as well as a 
“direct,” or lawful, relation between the object at hand and the object manipulated by this in-hand-
object (see also Leeuwen et al, 1994). When we pick up a screwdriver it becomes part of us, it is 
lift-able and grasp-able, and its functionality becomes part of our capacity. We are screwing out the 
screws using a screwdriver. There is a inter-dependent and mutual connection between these two 
types of relations, the one between us and the screwdriver, and the other between the screwdriver 
and the screw. And this connection is, in lack of a better word, inter-direct, and not in-direct. 
The third level is what I do with the things through other things. I pour water into the can over the 
beans and what comes into the can is therefore coffee. No mysterious process is involved, except 
for the un-initiated into the art of coffee making, but what I hear when I hear the water drizzle into 
the can is coffee filling up the coffee can. I need to be aware of two things at the same time, one is 
that I do not pour too much water into the filter holder and the other is that I do not pour too much 
coffee into the can. I suggest that awareness of the first kind is “doing things with things”, or B for 
short as illustrated in figure 2, and the second kind is what I termed above as “doing things with 
things with things”, or C as illustrated in figure 3. This relation is also inter-direct; I do not need to 
infer that coffee is being made, when I pour boiled water over the correctly prepared arrangement. 
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What I need, though, is to learn this relation, sometime painstakingly, and this process might 
include inferential or indirect aspect, though it often rests on practical experience with the tool that 
is to be learned. 
These three levels are the operational aspect of making coffee, and I need to focus my attention on 
the various levels at various times. Sometimes I need to consider whether I am able to do something 
or not with a thing, at other times (mostly?) I am focused on making the things do what I would like 
them to do, and again at other times I need to be aware of something that the things do to each other 
through my operations with them. The “direct” and “inter-direct” character of awareness does not 
exclude, as I have indicated above, that other kinds of awareness can be necessary or in play. What 
it means is that most of our activity with familiar things are based on the “direct” and “inter-direct” 
awareness of our surroundings, not on symbolic mediational awareness or inferential processes. 
 
This, however, is only one kind of parsing of the events that we are enmeshed in every day. What I 
want when I am focusing on any of the three levels is still the making of coffee. All these doing-
things-things are nested within my overall activity, which is to make the coffee in order to drink it. 
What rules my behaviour is the wish or need for coffee, and the resulting coffee, which still only 
‘exists’ as components, therefore motivates my activity; it is why I make coffee, because I want 
coffee. What I do during the process is directing my attention towards the three various levels 
mentioned above (A, B, C), a directing being necessitated by the very activity with the things. How 
I do it is prescribed by what I want to do and constrained by the conditions in my surroundings.  
I have tried to draw this out in the below figure: 
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Figure 5: a different parsing of the coffee-making process (I am uncertain about the terminology in the above figure, so 
please correct me if you have better wordings [NB: “coffee” under object centred in Goal/action is of course necessary 
for drinking coffee, not just a cup) 
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Another fact is that some of the things we do when we make coffee are very dependent of the serial 
order and some are not. For example, I need to get a boiler, pour water and plug the boiler into the 
electrical system before I can cook the water. I do not need to prepare the filter, coffee beans, and 
holder before the water has been boiled, but I am free to do it if I like. I cannot pour the boiled 
water without this preparation, though. (I have experienced to mess up the order by forgetting to put 
beans in the filter, forgetting to boil the water before pouring, forgetting to put the filter before the 
beans, and every one of these mistakes (made in a distracted moment) did not make any coffee out 
of the activity.) I do not need to get a cup before I want to pour coffee into it, and I don’t need to 
clean up before drinking my coffee, so the clean-up event cluster can be postponed to later, 
However, it makes no sense to clean up before I am finished with pouring the boiled water into the 
coffee can. 
There is some variability but not a whole lot of it. If I want to be an efficient or rational coffee-
maker there might be an optimal process in all this.  
 
How can this help us to; 1) design “intuitive” interfaces in programmable technologies, and 2) 
evaluate the designs (whether in advance of production or in retrospect)? First we need to be clear 
that there is in principle no difference between the use of things and the use of a programmable 
interface within this way of parsing it. Using an “actual” object to procure some thing with or 
programming a VCR using a remote control are different as a matter of quantity and not quality, so 
to speak. They both necessitate operations, they both have nested events within larger events, and 
they both have relations that you manipulate by manipulating other relations. The difference, as I 
see it, lies in how the levels utilises different capacities, are robust to serial variations of sub-events, 
makes necessary information available, guides behaviour, and not in if.  
 
… Analysis needed on programmable technology within this terminology… 
 
 -see Karat, J., Karat, C-M-, & Ukelson, J. (2000): Affordances, Motivation, and the 
 Design of User Interfaces: Communications of the ACM, V. 43(8), pp.49-51. 
 -St. Amant, R. (1999): User Interface Affordances in a Planning Representation: 
  Human-Computer Interaction, v. 14(3B), pp.317-355. 
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I have tried to show a way of understanding the process of doing something in a world of things, 
and using the things either in themselves or in connection with other things. The three levels 
mentioned above are by no means a complete picture of the possibilities in the environment, but 
might describe the character of some of the more typical activities with things.  
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The user uses an object: 
What is an artefact and how is it used, intended and non-intended. 
 
User: Uses: Object: 
Physical properties  Physical properties 
Body metric Affordance as activity 
Use as activity 
Environmental metric 
Normal Non-normal Intended Non-intended Designed or 
planned  
‘artefact’ 
Non-designed 
 ‘natural’ 
Bad 
 
Good Bad Good Bad Good  Bad Good  
   
   
   
 
There seems to be two senses of bad—good that is applicable in respect to the user. The first of the 
two senses is bad as poor contrasted with good as excellent. Now we have an agent or user who can 
be a poor user, one who probably suffers from some kind of technological helplessness (a la 
Seligman’s concept of learned helplessness in depression). This user does not understand the 
objects use, and, hence, cannot use it, neither as it is intended or otherwise. Then there is the 
excellent user, who qua his/her proficiency, or just a ‘natural knack’ for things, always does the 
‘right’ thing, and knows how to operate something in accordance with its intended use.  
The second of the two senses is bad as different [odd?] contrasted with good as compliant. The 
different [odd?] user will typically use an artefact as it pleases him/her, not bothering whether it is 
designed for this or that particular use. The compliant user will only use the artefact in accordance 
with its prescription (and might even be somewhat tense, when it is used for other purposes). 
The two categories are not exclusive and most users would be some of both: 
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Figure 5: A tentative bad—good differentiation when it comes to the user. 
 
When it comes to the design of a thing we can only apply the poor—excellent usage, because the 
designer will typically want some specific operation to be realizable by the product. So the 
‘intention’ of the design is to provide the user with some means for realizing a goal (or maybe the 
artefact is also the goal, like a VCR and the viewing of videos). Even if there are standards on the 
area the implementation is on the poor—excellent pole, and not on the compliant—different. The 
implementation might differ from certain standards but it will still be evaluated on whether it is a 
poor (bad) or an excellent (good) design. 
When it comes to the use of something, we might even not be able to apply good and bad to use. If 
we do, we would probably mean something like intended and non-intended; that is, whether the use 
is in accordance with the intended design (good or bad) or not in accordance with the design. On the 
other hand, non-intended use is not necessarily ‘bad use’ as this does not rely solely on the 
‘intension’ implemented in the design but also on the situation in which it is used. A hammer might 
be used for a great variety of uses (bottle opener, paperweight, throwing object) without the use is 
the ‘intended’ use, hammering. These uses, however, are neither bad in the sense of ‘poor’ nor bad 
in the sense of ‘different’. They are part of the normal and social praxis with the object, the 
normalized or canonical uses (Costall, 1997).  
Is the canonical – non-canonical pole a separate dimension in the above figure 4, or is it an area that 
defines use? 
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Figure 6: separate dimension  Figure 7: Area marking 
 
 
Design:  -Profound design (invention)  –tends towards both intended and non- 
      intended use, not canonical yet 
 -Functional design   –tends towards intended use, canonical 
 -Aesthetic design   –tends towards intended use, canonical 
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